The impact of individuals’ access to constitutional justice on achieving the principle of constitutional supremacy in light of Algerian and Tunisian constitutional reform
https://doi-001.org/1025/17647730346285
Reception date :12.03.2025, Acceptance:10.05.2025 , Publication: 10.11.2025
MATALLAH Abdel Kerim
University of El Oued-Algeria
Matallahabdelkerim39@gmail.com
DJELLOUL Mohammed Salah
University of El Oued -Algeria
MEDELLEL Chaouki
University of El Oued- Algeria
Medellel-chaouki@univ-eloued.dz
Reception date :12.03.2025 , Acceptance:10.05.2025 , Publication: 10.11.2025
Abstract:
Constitutional justice is a fundamental mechanism in the constitutional history of any country, as it allows for the effective establishment of a state of law and justice. It highlights the important role of the constitutional judiciary in protecting the freedoms and rights of individuals through their contribution to revising the legal system from unconstitutional legislative provisions. This is an important step that lies at the heart of the challenges related to embodying and achieving the principle of constitutional supremacy. What is consistent with modern trends in constitutional justice is enabling individuals to access it through their practice of the mechanism of challenging the unconstitutionality of laws as a consequence thereof. The choice of Tunisia and Algeria to move towards constitutional justice has been considered an important step towards achieving a state of law and justice and guaranteeing rights and freedoms, embodying the supremacy of the constitution in Tunisia, starting with the constitutional reform of 2014 and leading up to the 2022 Constitution, and in Algeria, starting with the constitutional reform of 2016 and leading up to the 2020 Constitution.
Keywords: Constitutional justice, the plea of unconstitutionality, the rule of law, the principle of the supremacy of the constitution, the rights and freedoms of individuals, the constitutional judiciary.
Introduction:
The importance of constitutional justice is highlighted in its constitutional dimension, which is embodied in ensuring the supremacy of the constitution and is reflected in the protection of individuals’ rights and freedoms from violations resulting from the existence of defective legislative or regulatory provisions due to unconstitutionality. This is achieved through its effect in ensuring individuals’ access to the constitutional court via the mechanism of challenging the unconstitutionality of laws, which allows litigants to raise it before judicial authorities that then refer it to the constitutional court. In this context, the importance of the plea of unconstitutionality is evident in its functional and procedural dimension, which largely aligns with modern constitutional judicial trends, making the constitutional judiciary the most important guarantee for protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed to individuals under the constitutional text through subsequent review of laws after their enactment.
Given that most countries recognize individuals’ right to access constitutional justice via the constitutional judiciary using the mechanism of challenging unconstitutionality, the adoption by the Tunisian and Algerian constitutional founders of subsequent judicial review alongside prior judicial review represents a qualitative shift in the constitutional history of both countries. In Tunisia, a Constituent Assembly was elected on March 3, 2011, tasked with drafting a new Constitution for the Republic of Tunisia, which was ratified on July 27, 2014. This confirmed that the Tunisian constitutional founder was moving towards constitutional justice through the creation of the Constitutional Court, replacing the Constitutional Council, and constitutionally guaranteeing individuals’ right to access constitutional justice via the incidental plea of unconstitutionality to ensure rights and freedoms. However, due to ongoing crises and political tensions, the Constitution was suspended on July 25, 2021, and preparations for a new constitutional amendment culminated in the 2022 Constitution, which maintained individuals’ right of access to constitutional justice.
The Algerian constitutional founder followed a dual path in constitutional reform oriented towards constitutional justice, beginning with the 2016 constitutional amendment aimed at activating judicial review of the constitutionality of laws, adopting the sole indicator of constitutionally guaranteeing individuals’ right to raise the plea of unconstitutionality while retaining the Constitutional Council as an independent body responsible for ensuring compliance with the Constitution. This demonstrates that the concept of moving towards constitutional justice is not closed but open to reinforcement, which was further supported by the second indicator of constitutionalizing the Constitutional Court as an independent institution responsible for ensuring constitutional compliance through the subsequent amendment following the popular referendum of November 1, 2020, initiated by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune. This was a significant event that preserved individuals’ right to access constitutional justice while enhancing the mechanism of raising the plea of unconstitutionality, opening the door for enrichment by university professors specializing in constitutional law.
Based on the above, the main issue arises: to what extent does constitutionally guaranteeing individuals’ access to constitutional justice through Algerian and Tunisian constitutional reform contribute to achieving the principle of constitutional supremacy? And does this right reflect the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution?
Addressing such a question highlights the difficulty of providing a complete answer. For methodological purposes in this article, we will primarily rely on the descriptive and analytical method of constitutional and legislative texts to clarify the role of individuals’ access to constitutional justice through the use of the plea of unconstitutionality as a resulting effect to protect constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms, thereby achieving and embodying the principle of constitutional supremacy.
Studying this subject requires, without a doubt, a dual-plan approach. Accordingly, this study will include two main sections, each containing two subsections, aimed at covering the essential aspects of the research.
First Axis: The right of individuals to raise the plea of unconstitutionality as an innovative mechanism for protecting constitutional supremacy in Algeria
- Section 1: Context of establishing individuals’ right to use the plea of
unconstitutionality in the 2016 constitutional reform
- Section 2: Context of establishing individuals’ right to use the plea of unconstitutionality in the 2020 constitutional reform
Second Axis: The right of individuals to raise the plea of unconstitutionality as an innovative mechanism for protecting constitutional supremacy in Tunisia
- Section 1: Context of establishing individuals’ right to use the plea of
unconstitutionality in the 2014 constitutional reform
- Section 2: Context of establishing individuals’ right to use the plea of
unconstitutionality in the 2022 constitutional reform
First Axis:
The right of individuals to raise the plea of unconstitutionality as an innovative mechanism for protecting constitutional supremacy in Algeria
To overcome the political situation and protect fundamental principles and constitutional texts concerning the structure of the state following the 2016 Constitution, the context of constitutional reforms required protecting individuals’ basic rights and freedoms by moving from merely stipulating them in the Constitution to establishing a mechanism that individuals themselves could use. The Algerian approach to constitutional justice followed a dual path, beginning with the 2016 constitutional amendment in response to a timid revolutionary situation, resulting in a partial constitutional reform to activate judicial review of laws. It adopted the sole indicator of constitutionalizing individuals’ right to raise the plea of unconstitutionality while emphasizing the retention of the Constitutional Council. This demonstrates that the approach towards constitutional justice was open for reinforcement, which was further supported by the second indicator—elevating the Constitutional Council to a Constitutional Court, enabling the modernization and revival of the plea of unconstitutionality as a necessary tool to remedy unconstitutional defects through the subsequent constitutional amendment following the November 1, 2020, popular referendum.
Subsection 1: Context of establishing individuals’ right to use the plea of unconstitutionality in the 2016 constitutional reform
Considering that judicial review of the constitutionality of laws is one of the most important legal mechanisms ensuring a state of law and justice through proper institutional functioning by guaranteeing and embodying the principle of constitutional supremacy as the fundamental law protecting individual and collective rights and freedoms, there arose the necessity to create a new mechanism previously unknown in Algerian constitutional practice—the plea of unconstitutionality—under Article 188 of the 2016 constitutional amendment. Article 15 of the same amendment provided a minimum three-year period before its implementation. Indeed, Organic Law No. 18-16 was issued, specifying the conditions and procedures for implementing the plea of unconstitutionality, enabling individuals to exercise this mechanism and opening the door to access constitutional justice. Its objectives can be summarized in two branches:
- Subsection 1: The 2016 constitutional amendment opened indirect access for individuals to constitutional justice
- Subsection 2: The plea of unconstitutionality as a necessary tool to protect rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution
Subsection 1: The 2016 constitutional amendment opened indirect access for individuals to constitutional justice
In this regard, the Algerian constitutional founder enabled individuals to access constitutional justice indirectly through the 2016 constitutional reform, granting them the right to contest any legislative text they considered unconstitutional, raising the plea of unconstitutionality during judicial proceedings to protect and reinforce constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms.
Firstly, the plea of unconstitutionality in light of the 2016 constitutional legislation is based on two main steps: expanding civil and political rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights; and granting individuals the right to use the plea of unconstitutionality through Article 188 of the 2016 Algerian constitutional amendment, which includes:
- Defining the rights and freedoms subject to the plea of unconstitutionality as guaranteed by the Constitution.
- Retaining the Constitutional Council to ensure respect for the Constitution.
- Maintaining political oversight alongside subsequent judicial review.
- The issue of unconstitutionality cannot be raised directly before the Constitutional Council but must arise from a dispute before judicial authorities.
Secondly, the plea of unconstitutionality is a right granted by the Constitution to the litigant to raise it directly before the judge:
According to Article 188 of the 2016 constitutional amendment, citizens cannot raise the issue of unconstitutionality directly before the Constitutional Council. It is required that the person raising the issue is a party to a dispute before judicial authorities, meaning the plea of unconstitutionality is raised before the judge directly within the context of the dispute. This right, as constitutionally granted to the litigant, implies that the plea cannot be initiated by the judge or public prosecutor independently and is not a matter of public order.
Subsecion 2: The plea of unconstitutionality as a necessary tool to protect rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution
The plea of unconstitutionality, according to Article 188 of the 2016 constitutional amendment, is a procedure allowing for the remedy of unconstitutional defects violating an individual’s constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms. The constitutionalizing of the plea can be understood from two perspectives:
Firstly, the plea of unconstitutionality is a necessary tool ensuring individuals’ contribution to purifying the legal system from unconstitutional legislation. The constitutionalizing of the plea embodies protection of human rights in general and strengthens the rule of law, requiring that the effectiveness of these rights be guaranteed, extending constitutional review to practical application and enabling individuals to contribute to purifying the legislative system from unconstitutional provisions that might escape prior review.
Secondly, the plea of unconstitutionality is a means for individuals to remedy violations of their constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms due to unconstitutional legislative provisions. Constitutional rules guarantee the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms, constraining authorities. However, the application of laws may violate certain rights or liberties, making the plea of unconstitutionality a necessary tool for individuals to remedy such defects through disputes submitted to judicial authorities and referred to the Constitutional Council, within legally defined frameworks under Organic Law No. 18-16.
Subsection 2: Context of establishing individuals’ right to use the plea of unconstitutionality in the 2020 constitutional reform
Following the adoption of constitutional reforms after political consultations, the 2016 constitutional amendment did not meet public expectations, leading to the 22 February 2019 popular movement demanding further amendments. Consequently, the 2020 constitutional amendment, resulting from the November 1, 2020, referendum initiated by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, aimed to enhance the constitutional review of laws, replace the Constitutional Council with a Constitutional Court, and modernize and activate the plea of unconstitutionality. This was confirmed by Organic Law No. 22-19, which specifies procedures for notification and referral before the Algerian Constitutional Court, repealing Organic Law 18-16 of September 2, 2016. This context can be detailed in two branches:
- Subsection 1: Elevating the Constitutional Council to a Constitutional Court as necessary to align with the judicial nature of the plea of unconstitutionality
- Subsection 2: Modernizing and activating the judicial nature of individuals’ right to raise the plea of unconstitutionality
Subsection 1: Elevating the Constitutional Council to a Constitutional Court to align with the judicial nature of the plea of unconstitutionality
The constitutional founder constitutionalized subsequent review as a remedy for what might escape prior review or reveal defects due to unconstitutionality in practice. From the 2016 constitutional amendment, individuals’ right to access constitutional justice using the plea of unconstitutionality was embodied more effectively in the 2020 constitutional amendment through restructuring the constitutional institution by creating the Constitutional Court instead of the Constitutional Council, granting it the power to consider the plea of unconstitutionality under Article 195.
Firstly, excluding the Constitutional Council due to its political nature, which was incompatible with the judicial nature of the plea of unconstitutionality: the 2016 reform retained the Constitutional Council as an independent body ensuring constitutional supremacy and granting individuals the right to protect their rights and freedoms via the plea of unconstitutionality. The Council failed in protecting the Constitution due to its political nature, incompatible with the judicial character of the incidental plea, which requires judicial review by courts, confirming the judicial nature of the plea of unconstitutionality.
Secondly, establishing the Constitutional Court for its judicial nature compatible with the judicial nature of the plea of unconstitutionality: the constitutionalization of the plea as a first indicator towards constitutional justice, and the exclusion of the Constitutional Council, led to selecting an alternative body to guarantee constitutional supremacy by assuming judicial review of laws instead of political review. This is exercised by a judicial body intervening to issue judgments on a law’s conformity with the Constitution. The constitutional judge’s task is confined to reviewing the constitutionality of laws, requiring the Constitutional Court, created under the 2020 constitutional amendment (Article 185), to align with the judicial nature of the plea of unconstitutionality.
Subsection 2: Modernizing and Activating the Judicial Nature of Individuals’ Right to Raise the Plea of Unconstitutionality
The provisions of Article 188 of the 2016 constitutional amendment were modified by the 2020 constitutional amendment under Article 195, which maintained individuals’ right to raise the plea of unconstitutionality, while expanding the scope of its use to include regulatory provisions alongside legislative provisions on which the outcome of a dispute depends and that violate rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. This confirms the direction of the Algerian constitutional founder through constitutional reforms towards activating judicial review of laws as a result of the effects stemming from the use of the plea, by providing individuals with the opportunity to notify the Algerian Constitutional Court indirectly. This allows and emphasizes the judiciary’s contribution to its activation. Within this branch, the conditions of this modernization and activation are identified from two perspectives:
First: Subjecting regulations to subsequent constitutional review instead of prior review through individuals’ use of the plea of unconstitutionality.
The Algerian constitutional founder, through the 2020 constitutional reform, emphasized the openness of subsequent review by subjecting regulations to review via the plea of unconstitutionality under Article 195 of the Constitution, alongside legislative provisions. Subsequent review of regulations serves as a remedy for their escape from prior review due to their nature of issuance, as:
- “They are unknown and can only be challenged by those entitled after publication in the Official Gazette,” and because, like other laws, they are subject to the logic that:
- “Application reveals the defect of the provision and its deviation from the constitutional rule.”
Second: Repeal of Organic Law 18-16 and issuance of Organic Law 22-19 regarding procedures and methods of referral to the Constitutional Court concerning the plea of unconstitutionality.
To activate the judicial nature of the plea of unconstitutionality, which ensures respect for the rights and freedoms of individuals guaranteed by the Constitution, the Algerian legislator issued Organic Law No. 22-19 specifying procedures and methods of notification and referral before the Constitutional Court, replacing Organic Law No. 18-16, which defined conditions and procedures for applying the plea. Some amendments concerned procedures and methods of referring challenges of unconstitutionality to make it more effective than under Law 18-16.
Second Topic:
Individuals’ Right to Raise the Plea of Unconstitutionality as an Innovative Mechanism to Protect Constitutional Supremacy in Tunisia
The protests and popular uprisings that erupted in Tunisia since early 2011, sweeping across the Maghreb region, led to the largest constitutional reform movement, including the Tunisian Revolution. After arduous efforts and the proposal of several constitutional drafts, a new Constitution was issued in 2014, confirming the Tunisian constitutional founder’s direction towards constitutional justice through the creation of the Constitutional Court, replacing the Constitutional Council, and affirming individuals’ right to access constitutional justice via the incidental plea of unconstitutionality—considered a significant step toward guaranteeing rights and freedoms in Tunisia. However, Tunisian crises and political tensions delayed its establishment. Until it was set up, a temporary body was created to oversee the constitutionality of draft laws. The absence of the Constitutional Court led to the suspension of the 2014 Constitution on July 25, 2021, and preparation for a new constitutional amendment issued in 2022, which emphasized activating review of laws via constitutional justice using the same two indicators. Accordingly, the right of individuals to raise the plea of unconstitutionality as an innovative mechanism to protect rights and freedoms in Tunisia is analyzed through the following two demands:
Section One: Context of granting individuals the right to use the plea of unconstitutionality under the 2014 constitutional reform
Demand Two: Context of granting individuals the right to use the plea of unconstitutionality under the 2022 constitutional reform
Seciton One: Context of granting individuals the right to use the plea of unconstitutionality under the 2014 Tunisian constitutional reform
Following the December 17, 2010 – January 14, 2011 Revolution, the Constituent Assembly drafted a new Constitution, officially ratified on January 27, 2014. The reform upgraded the Tunisian Constitutional Council to a Constitutional Court, exercising new, highly significant powers, fundamentally changing the nature of Tunisian constitutional justice. Among the most important powers was the authority to adjudicate the plea of unconstitutionality of the law applicable to disputes submitted by parties in cases originally filed before ordinary courts. This reflected the democratic trajectory and individuals’ access to constitutional justice within the framework setting conditions and restrictions, as detailed below:
Subsection One:
The 2014 Tunisian Constitution as a democratic gain reflecting individuals’ access to constitutional justice
The 2014 constitutional reform elevated the oversight body from a Constitutional Council to a Constitutional Court with new powers of great importance, changing the nature of Tunisian constitutional justice. While the previous oversight was preventive political review, the 2014 Constitution added new powers, notably the authority to rule on the plea of unconstitutionality in cases originally submitted before courts, as stated in Article 54 of the Organic Law concerning the Constitutional Court: “Parties in cases originally submitted before courts may raise the plea of unconstitutionality of the law applicable to the dispute.” This confirms individuals’ right to challenge laws and expands notification to the Constitutional Court as a constitutional choice to activate review of the constitutionality of laws, including indirect notification to the Court under the 2014 Constitution, applicable only to cases referred by courts upon request of a party, according to legal procedures.
First: Constitutionalizing of the plea of unconstitutionality to confirm the democratic dimension in Tunisia’s move toward constitutional justice
Given the pivotal role of the Constitution in the legal system, it holds special symbolism in drafting a new Constitution amidst popular demands. The 2014 Tunisian Constitution reflects this development, expanding constitutional provisions and covering multiple constitutional issues, highlighting the principles of rule of law and democracy.
Second: Constitutionalizing of the plea of unconstitutionality to ensure protection of rights and freedoms
In addition to affirming the democratic transition in Tunisia, the Constitution confirmed the protection of rights and freedoms, particularly in Chapter Two, covering the right to life, freedom of belief, confidentiality of correspondence, human dignity, prohibition of torture, freedom of domicile, and protection against deprivation of nationality. This necessitated including the plea of unconstitutionality to prevent laws violating the Constitution from infringing on rights and freedoms even after enactment.
Branch Two: The 2014 Tunisian Constitution to define the regulatory framework for the plea of unconstitutionality (conditions and safeguards)
According to Article 120 of the 2014 Tunisian Constitution, the newly established Constitutional Court exercises subsequent review of laws via the plea of unconstitutionality through a request submitted by a party in a dispute before ordinary or administrative courts, challenging the constitutionality of the law applied in the case to protect their constitutional rights and freedoms and to purify the legal system from unconstitutional laws. The Tunisian legislator-imposed conditions and restrictions through Organic Law No. 50 of 2015 concerning the Constitutional Court.
First: Conditions for raising the plea of unconstitutionality under the 2014 Constitution to enable individuals’ participation in protecting their rights and freedoms
The Constitutional Court required the plea to be submitted in a separate memorandum, duly reasoned, drafted by a lawyer authorized for appeal, containing detailed reasons and specifying the provisions challenged. The court only refers the plea to the Constitutional Court without assessing its merit, and referral decisions are final.
Second: Safeguards for the plea of unconstitutionality to enable individuals’ contribution to purifying the legal system from unconstitutional laws
To avoid overloading the Constitutional Court, special committees examine whether the plecomplies with formal and procedural requirements. The Court then rules on the referrals deemed compliant, with decisions reasoned by absolute majority unless exceptions apply.
Section Two: Context of granting individuals the right to use the plea of unconstitutionality under the 2022 Tunisian constitutional reform
The weaknesses of the 2014 Constitution created political tension, prompting the Tunisian Presidency to propose a new Constitution, presented to a referendum on July 25, 2022, published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 2022. The 2022 Constitution retained the full chapter on rights and freedoms, adding explicit protections, including rights of the elderly, enhancing the role of the Constitutional Court in building a state governed by law, and reinforcing democracy and protection of individual and collective rights through the plea of unconstitutionality. Its effects are analyzed through the following branches:
Subsection One: Enhancing the role and status of the Tunisian Constitutional Court in building a state governed by law
The Constitutional Court is the core of the state of rights and freedoms, as affirmed by the 2022
reform. Its composition includes nine members appointed by the President of the Republic, divided into three groups from senior judicial and administrative authorities. Members elect a president and vice-president. Retirement triggers automatic replacement, with membership lasting at least one year.
Subsection Two: The Constitutional Court examines laws referred by courts if challenged for unconstitutionality under the 2022 constitutional amendment
Individuals’ access to constitutional justice allows parties in cases originally filed before courts to raise the plea via a separate, reasoned memorandum drafted by a lawyer. The Court examines formal and procedural compliance through one or more special committees before ruling. If the Court finds a law unconstitutional, its application is suspended, without retroactive effect on acquired rights or final cases.
Subsection Two: Deepening democracy and protecting individual and collective rights and freedoms
Given the Tunisian people’s struggle for free elections and democracy, constitutional justice is a strategic option to safeguard democracy alongside ordinary, administrative, and financial courts. The 2022 reform defines the constitutional and legislative framework for subsequent review alongside prior review, ensuring protection of rights and freedoms.
First: Constitutional justice as a strategic option to consolidate and embody democracy in Tunisia
Comparative constitutional experiences confirm the judicial role in consolidating participatory and representative democracy, achieving constitutional legitimacy and legal justice. The 2022 amendment emphasizes the Constitutional Court’s role in reviewing constitutionality, protecting rights and freedoms, and ensuring constitutional supremacy—a victory for democracy.
Second: Defining the constitutional and legislative framework regarding rights and freedoms to implement subsequent review of the constitutionality of laws
To prevent tyranny and strengthen guarantees, the 2022 constitutional amendment set limits on rights and freedoms, maintaining Organic Law No. 50 of 2015 to regulate the Constitutional Court and the plea of unconstitutionality, ensuring flexible, efficient, and effective application to protect rights and freedoms. Subsequent review addresses the shortcomings of prior review, covering laws whose defects appear only after practical application.
Conclusion:
Both the Algerian and Tunisian legislators, by introducing the mechanism of challenging the constitutionality of laws through the Constitutional Court as the constitutionally competent authority to exercise subsequent judicial constitutional review, took a distinguished step that serves to strengthen constitutional justice and individuals’ access to it. This, in turn, guarantees the protection of collective and individual rights and freedoms and shields them from violations through the Algerian constitutional reforms of both 2016 and 2020, and the Tunisian constitutional reforms of both 2014 and 2022. Furthermore, through establishing the legal and procedural framework, as enacted by the Algerian legislator by replacing Organic Law No. 18-16, which defined the conditions and procedures for applying the unconstitutionality objection, with Organic Law No. 22-19, which sets out the procedures and methods for notification and referral before the Algerian Constitutional Court, and by the Tunisian legislator through Tunisian Basic Law No. 50 of 2015 relating to the Tunisian Constitutional Court, constitutional justice is realized. Its impact is significant and can be considered as results followed by the recommendations listed below:
Results:
01. Deepening the democratic process through individuals’ contribution to purifying the legal system from elements of unconstitutionality.
02. Moving towards constitutional justice through the establishment of the Constitutional Court, necessitated by the judicial nature of the unconstitutionality mechanism.
03. Activating constitutional review of laws by introducing subsequent judicial constitutional review alongside previous political constitutional review to address the shortcomings arising from exercising the latter without subsequent review.
04. Ensuring the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution when exercising the mechanism of challenging unconstitutionality within the constitutional, legal, and procedural framework.
05. Achieving legal certainty and stability of legal positions to ensure the principle of constitutional supremacy through challenging the unconstitutionality of laws even after their practical application.
Recommendations:
01. Deepen the democratic process by enabling the composition of the Tunisian Constitutional Court to exercise its competencies, including exercising subsequent judicial constitutional review.
02. Work on updating, activating, and clarifying the unconstitutionality mechanism in Tunisia by precisely regulating it to fill the legislative gap represented by its regulation in an independent law.
03. Ensure a careful balance between expanding individuals’ right to refer matters to the Tunisian Constitutional Court and preventing overwhelming the court with appeals due to weak filtering mechanisms, which could lead to difficulties in managing the judicial system.
04. Remove the complex referral conditions to the Algerian Constitutional Court to facilitate and ease its activation.
05. Find a solution for delays in adjudication and decision-making by the original judicial authority due to referrals of the unconstitutionality objection to the Constitutional Court.
06. Reduce the response and adjudication period by the Algerian Constitutional Court regarding the unconstitutionality mechanism to ensure its effectiveness and activation.
07. Continue raising awareness among individuals about the legal value of the unconstitutionality mechanism, considering it an important legislative and constitutional achievement in the Tunisian and Algerian legal systems, allowing citizens to challenge the constitutionality of laws and ensuring the protection of rights and freedoms from violations.
First: List of References and Sources
A: Sources List
01. Algerian Constitutional Amendment of 2016
02. Algerian Constitutional Amendment of 2020
03. Tunisian Constitutional Amendment of 2014
04. Tunisian Constitutional Amendment of 2022
05. Organic Law No. 18-16 dated 02/09/2016, defining the conditions and procedures for applying the unconstitutionality objection, Algerian Official Gazette, No. 54, dated 05/03/2018.
06. Organic Law No. 22-19, dated 25 July 2022, setting procedures and methods for notification and referral before the Constitutional Court, Algerian Official Gazette No. 51, dated 31 July 2022.
07. Tunisian Basic Law No. 50 of 2015 dated 3 December 2015 relating to the Tunisian
Constitutional Court, Official Gazette of the Republic of Tunisia, No. 98, dated 8 December 2015.
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